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Background: The aim of this study was to develop an instrument to measure laypeople’s beliefs about the nature
of medical knowledge and knowing (the EBAM). Such beliefs should be a target of increased research interest
because they influence how people handle medical information, for example in shared decision making.
Methods: An online survey was completed by 284 participants. Items assessed different aspects of laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine and explicitly focused on the appearance of medical knowledge in everyday life
and the evaluation of different sources as a way to justify knowledge.
Results: Factor analysis yielded a five-factor solution for the instrument. Dimensions covered by the instrument are
certainty of medical knowledge, credibility of medical textbooks, credibility of medical information on the Internet,
justification of medical knowledge, and preliminarity of medical knowledge.
Conclusions: Results indicate that laypeople have meaningful beliefs about the nature of medical knowledge and
the trustworthiness of different sources. The instrument developed seems promising for measuring laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine, which may help to increase patients’ compliance in medical decision making.Background
This article describes the rationale and empirical testing
of an instrument to measure laypeople’s epistemic beliefs
about medicine (EBAM).
Why are laypeople’s epistemic beliefs about medicine
important and of interest for health psychology issues?
For shared decision making and for patients’ treatment
adherence, it is necessary for patients to understand the
complexity and, at times, uncertainty of medical know-
ledge [1,2]. Imagine a male patient diagnosed with high
cholesterol. His general practitioner has made clear that
he should avoid eating butter and red meat and that it
might be of value to take some medication to lower the
cholesterol level. The patient will probably search for add-
itional information on what to do on the Internet [3]
(Google finds about 104.000.000 results for the keyword
“cholesterol”). There, he will come across web pages with
statements on the dangerousness as well as on the harm-
lessness of eating butter. He will find web pages that ad-
vertise a specific drug to lower cholesterol and Internet
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumways in how they control high cholesterol. In other words,
he will be confronted with a plenitude of information and
a multitude of opinions on a specific health-related prob-
lem. As a result, forming a conclusion about his future be-
havior will be quite difficult and the treatment of
cholesterol may in his view be a complex and ill-
structured problem (which it might also be in experts’
view [4]). The patient will have to undertake the task to
assess which information is more important and valid than
other information, how conflicts between various perspec-
tives of knowledge can be solved, and how conflicting evi-
dence could be integrated into a viable framework of
personal understanding and decision making. He will have
to cope with the fact that there are alternative treatments,
differing interpretations of symptoms or even several
interpretations of the underlying pathophysiological expla-
nations of illnesses and risks. How the patient assesses the
controversies (both on his own and in the next consult-
ation with the doctor), in how far he accepts that people
disagree on what is the best solution, how he reconciles
his own ideas with those of experts and whether he takes
advice from his doctor is influenced by the beliefs he holds
about the nature of medical knowledge and knowing,
called epistemic beliefs.ed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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his doctor and in how far he is willing to participate in
the decision making process, is not only influenced by
epistemic beliefs but also by many other factors, e.g. the
patients’ degree of anxiety, age or even their numeracy
skills [5]. Furthermore, various characteristics of the
doctor will play a role, e.g. his general consultation skills
[6] but also in how far he appears to be trustworthy and
competent [7] (and this evaluation of trustworthiness
and competence might again be influenced by epistemic
beliefs, see below).
Most problems patients are confronted with in med-
ical decision making require knowledge and expertise
which goes far beyond laypeople’s understanding. That
is, patients depend on experts' explanations and advice
and are not able to acquire the knowledge and skills
which would be necessary to directly assess the experts'
knowledge claims. However, patients will probably have
a more general idea about what constitutes trustworthy
and reliable knowledge claims, how one can obtain
knowledge, or how to identify credible sources for (medical)
information. That is, patients can refer to their epistemic
beliefs when they need to reflect critically about medical
information, evaluate what to believe, and which know-
ledge claim to support [8,9]. Epistemic beliefs are further-
more seen to function as an “apprehension structure”
[10]: they allow for an anticipation of the knowledge to be
learnt or to be dealt with, which includes for example an
expectation of the complexity of a topic and of how much
is already known about a topic.
As outlined above, medical problem solving often does
not result in one clear solution, and the lack of relevant
information for the problem-solving process is common
[11,12]. Because many health-related problems are con-
tentious and lack clear-cut solutions, they can be
described as ill-structured problems, that is, “problems
about which reasonable people reasonably disagree” [13].
Research in non-medical disciplines suggests that epi-
stemic beliefs play an important role in dealing with
such problems [8,13]. Therefore, assessing laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine is important.
As a result, patients’ epistemic beliefs play an import-
ant role in medical decision making. They can be seen
as a “must” for the exercise of patient rights, as they can
guide their medical decision making even though
patients do not have a conceptual understanding of the
problem at hand. However, also in the case that patients
prefer a rather paternalistic decision making model, their
epistemic beliefs will still play a role insofar as that they
may guide the choice of the expert to be trusted.
Therefore, laypeople’s epistemic beliefs about medicine
should become a topic for research in health psychology.
Psychological research on epistemic beliefs provides a
profound background for this target.Research on epistemic beliefs
During the last two decades, epistemic beliefs have be-
come a target of increased research interest in develop-
mental and educational psychology [14-16]. Epistemology
as one cornerstone of philosophy embodies questions
about the processes by which human knowledge is justi-
fied as well as questions about the nature of knowledge
[17]. This leads to the most often used definition of the
construct epistemic beliefs which distinguishes between
the nature of knowledge and the nature (or process) of
knowing as the two core sets of concerns [18]. How one
conceptualizes knowledge and how it changes over time
are seen as aspects of the nature of knowledge, while con-
siderations about where knowledge comes from and how
to make justifications refer to beliefs about the nature of
knowing. Epistemic beliefs range from a less advanced
view to more advanced epistemologies and develop
through life and from educational experiences [19,20].
Whereas a less advanced view includes beliefs such as that
knowledge is certain and stable, either true or false, and
can be handed down by an authority, a more advanced
view is characterized by beliefs that knowledge is rather
complex and relativistic, by accepting the uncertainty and
changeability of truth, and acknowledging that knowledge
is construed individually.
It is assumed that people possess both discipline-
general and discipline-specific epistemic beliefs (beliefs
about specific academic fields) concurrently [21-23].
Discipline-specific beliefs are presumed to play a pre-
dominant role when working on a discipline-specific
problem, while discipline-general beliefs influence mo-
tivation and engagement [17,24].
For example, studies reveal the important role of epi-
stemic beliefs in dealing with (scientific) controversies
[25-27]. An exemplary study [26] investigated the influ-
ence of high school students’ epistemic understanding
on the critical interpretation of a dual-position text. In
this study, an initial test of epistemic understanding
asked participants to indicate for pairs of contrasting
statements whether they think that only one of the views
described is right or whether both views could have
some rightness and – depending on the response to this
question (“if both could be right”) –whether one view
could be better than the other. According to this initial
test, participants were assigned to three groups of differ-
ent epistemic positions: participants primarily holding a
less advanced (seeing knowledge as absolute and either
right or wrong), moderate (seeing knowledge as idiosyn-
cratic, so that all positions are equally right), or more
advanced view (seeing knowledge as derived from rea-
son, so that some positions are more justified and sus-
tainable than others). All participants read a scientific
text about genetically modified food, introducing both
the position in favor and against such food. After
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clusion to the text. Findings showed that students with
more advanced and with moderate epistemic under-
standing reflected better on the inconclusive nature of
the debate on transgenic food than students with less
advanced beliefs.
Epistemic beliefs about medicine
To date, epistemic beliefs about medicine have rarely
been considered in psychological or medical research
[28]. This is in sharp contrast to the assumed import-
ance of such beliefs (outlined above). Evidence-based
medicine comes along with the need for advanced epi-
stemic beliefs [29,30]. Epistemic beliefs about medicine
should play a quite prominent role in everyday life, not
least because “the life of every individual is ripe with op-
portunities for applying health related knowledge” [31].
After a thorough review of the literature, few studies
explicitly assessed beliefs about the nature of medical
knowledge and knowing, and these studies did not deal
with laypeople. In one study [29], conceptions of medical
knowledge in an exploratory interview study on second-
year medical students were considered. Results show
that most students started medical school with rather
simplistic beliefs, for example, stating that if uncertainty
existed in some aspects of medical knowledge, this un-
certainty would only be temporary. Within their first
two years in medical school, most students changed
their understanding of medical knowledge with regard
to its certainty and considered medical knowledge open
to change or adaptation. That is, the experience that
medical knowledge less black or white than assumed led
students to question their former way of thinking about
medical knowledge.
Another study [32] attempted to elicit and analyze
general practice trainees’ and trainers’ beliefs about medical
knowledge and knowing in a focus-group approach. It
concluded that people’s epistemic beliefs are probably in-
fluential in the solution of medical problems.
In sum, the nature of medical knowledge and knowing
is not yet well researched, especially with regard to lay-
people’s beliefs. One first attempt to assess laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine is to develop an instru-
ment to survey such beliefs. However, no such medicine-
specific instrument exists. To date, research on laypeople’s
views on knowledge about medicine has only considered
laypeople’s subjective theories of illnesses [33]. Therefore,
the objective of the study described in the following is to
develop an instrument to survey laypeople’s epistemic
beliefs about medicine. More specifically, we aimed for an
instrument that assesses different aspects of laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine and that explicitly fo-
cuses on the appearance of medical knowledge in every-
day life. Items should especially consider that laypeoplemust rely on others to justify their beliefs and particu-




In this study, 284 people (125 male, 158 female) com-
pleted the questionnaire. Participants’ average age was
20.79 years (SD= 3.83). Among the participants, 161
were in the final classes of German higher school educa-
tion, while the other 123 were students of various sub-
jects, predominately belonging to the subject areas of
humanities and social sciences (30.1%), natural sciences
(13.8%), and economics (12.2%). Because none of the
participants’ studies focused on medical knowledge
(e.g., medicine, pharmacy), they were assumed to be lay-
people in this domain.
IRB approval for psychological survey studies is not
(yet) common practice in Germany. In consequence, we
did not apply for IRB approval. We did not collect data
with identifying information and participation was
voluntary.
Materials: construction of the instrument
The EBAM was intended to extend and refine earlier
work on discipline-specific measurement of epistemic
beliefs to reach a medicine-specific instrument. We
aimed for a questionnaire that explicitly focuses on the
appearance of medical knowledge in everyday life. That
is, it should consider such aspects of epistemic beliefs
that are crucial for laypeople’s search and evaluation of
competing sources of medical knowledge. In the first
step, we scanned existing discipline-specific question-
naires and surveyed their dimensions. As a result, we
selected several dimensions that should also be included
in the first item sample of the EBAM from the instru-
ment “Epistemological Beliefs Assessment for Physical
Science” (EBAPS) [34]. These were the structure of sci-
entific knowledge (whether knowledge is a coherent
whole or a bunch of weakly connected pieces), real-life
applicability (whether knowledge is applicable to real life
or only applicable to restricted spheres) and evolving
knowledge (whether knowledge is only mere opinion or
set in stone). We left out the EBAPS dimensions “nature
of knowing and learning” and “source of ability to learn”,
as they focus on aspects of intelligence and learning and
are therefore in our view [35] and the view of many
other researchers [18,36] outside the construct of epi-
stemic beliefs. We furthermore wished to consider the
dimension certainty of knowledge, which is arguably the
most agreed on dimension in conceptualizations of epi-
stemic beliefs [37-39]. The Global Certainty Scale [40],
which focuses on the fallibility of scientific knowledge,
seemed to be a promising source of inspiration. This
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knowledge and theories in the soft and hard sciences
are perceived as certain and unchangeable respectively
as changing and fallible (a sample item for this scale is
“Scientific theories can be proven false at any time”
(reverse scored)).
In addition, the EBAM should specifically take into ac-
count the situation that a layperson has to manage a
medical problem. Therefore, we included items on the
credibility of different sources in which a layperson
might search for medical information, namely the cred-
ibility of information on the Internet and the credibility
of information in textbooks. We also added items to
address a specific aspect of laypeople’s justification of
medical knowledge: How should one decide on a medical
treatment? Should one rely on current scientific research
results or on the experiences of an affected patient or
those of a general practitioner? These aspects are espe-
cially important with regard to laypeople’s epistemic
beliefs: Because laypeople do not have substantial know-
ledge or experiences themselves, they have to rely on
others to justify their beliefs. Furthermore, we added sev-
eral items focusing on theory versus facts as well as on the
connectedness, respectively isolatedness of medicine-
specific knowledge to assess the structure or simplicity of
medical knowledge.
All items collected were then rewritten, shortened, or
modified so that they clearly focused on the discipline of
medicine and laypeople’s understanding of it and could
be answered on a Likert scale. The resulting preliminary
version of the survey was carried out with a small num-
ber of individuals (six students) who were interviewed
after answering each question to ensure that items were
interpreted in a similar and intended way. After these
interviews, minor revisions of the items were made. The
final item pool for the EBAM consisted of 43 items that
could be answered on a five-point Likert scale, ranging
from “I totally disagree” to “I totally agree”. We adminis-
tered additional items that surveyed several demographi-
cal variables (age, sex, subject, and length of study when
applicable).
Procedure
The survey software “EFS Survey” by GlobalparkW was
used to build a web-based survey. Participants were
asked to participate in two different ways. Members of a
German social networking website for students were
invited to participate and students in their final year of
school were asked to participate during an open day at
the psychology department. Participation was voluntary.
This procedure was chosen because it was economic
and it ensured diversity and a heterogeneous sample. In
both data collections, the introduction of the survey
emphasized that all questions of the survey focus on apersonal view of medical knowledge and medical infor-
mation, and that there are no right or wrong answers.
Participants could take as much time as they needed to
answer all questions, that is, there was no time limit.
Results
Appropriateness of the data
Before conducting a factor analysis, some parameters
were checked to ensure that the data were appropriate
for factor analysis: A Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test revealed
that data are normally distributed. Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was statistically significant at p< .05, indicating
that items were not coincidentally correlated. The measure
of sampling adequacy was .72 for the initial sample, which
can be interpreted as “middling” [41]. In sum, data were
appropriate for factor analysis.
Decisions on model-fitting method, rotation method and
number of factors retained
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was determined as
the most appropriate form of analysis to uncover the
underlying structure of the set of variables. Maximum
Likelihood (ML) was chosen as the model-fitting method
[42,43] and we decided for an oblique rotation method
(direct oblimin rotation), because the statistical inde-
pendence of epistemic dimensions in the sense of uncor-
related factors is questionable.
According to the scree plot, a five-factor solution was
compared with a six-factor solution [43]. A comparison
of the item loadings showed that the five-factor solution
had the cleanest factor structure, which will therefore be
reported in the following results.
Factor solution
The five-factor solution was obtained by successively
omitting items with no substantial factor loadings. Fol-
lowing the rule of thumb for a minimum loading of .32
for an item [44], a total of 17 items were removed. As a
result, the final factor solution consisted of 24 items. ML
factor analysis generates a chi-square goodness-of-fit test
for the sample. Results underscored the goodness of fit
(χ2= 217.01; df= 166, p <. 01).
The first factor focused on the solvability of medical
questions and the certainty or stability of medical know-
ledge. Therefore, it was called Certainty of Medical
Knowledge. The factor consisted of seven items and
yielded an acceptable Cronbach's α-value (α= .69). The
dimension ranged from beliefs that there are or will be
clear answers to medical problems to beliefs that there is
no strong supporting evidence for medical knowledge.
An exemplar item of this factor is: “Research in medi-
cine has shown that there is one clear answer to most
problems.”
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cused on the credibility of textbooks as a source of
medical knowledge. The factor had a satisfactory α co-
efficient value (α = .73). This dimension ranged from
the assumption that medical textbooks always provide
credible information to the perception that the credibil-
ity of medical textbooks is always questionable and
should therefore be critically scrutinized. An example
item from this factor is: “Medical textbooks almost al-
ways contain reliable statements with regard to medical
research.”
The third factor consisted of four items focusing on
the credibility of the Internet as a source of knowledge.
Cronbach's α was .74. Comparable to factor 2, this di-
mension ranged from the assumption that medical infor-
mation on the Internet is always credible to the
perception that the credibility of medical information on
the Internet is always questionable and should therefore
be critically scrutinized. An item example is: “One can
almost always receive verified medical information on
the Internet.”
The fourth factor consisted of four items. The α coeffi-
cient reached a satisfactory .61. Items belonging to this
dimension took into account whether only people who
have a specific disease or physicians who are experi-
enced in treating a specific disease have true medical
knowledge. The factor also assessed the applicability of
medical research results. One of the items loading on
this factor is: “People who suffer from a disease usually
know better what to do than physicians.”
The fifth factor consisted of five items, focusing on the
preliminarity, respectively Stability of Medical Knowledge.
It yielded an acceptable Cronbach's α-value (α= .60). An
item representing this factor is “Scientific theories in
medicine, that I currently assume to be right, can be con-
futed in the future.”
Table 1 displays the pattern matrix for the reported
five-factor solution.
Estimated stability of the factor solution
For an estimation of the stability of the factor structure,
the FS parameter was calculated, which takes into ac-
count that the interpretation of factor loadings is
dependent on sample size [45]. For the EBAM, FS was
.91, indicating a good accord between the found factor
structure and the “real” factor structure.
Recoding of the items for further analyses
For the calculation of sum scores for the five factors,
several items need to be recoded after administering the
questionnaire. For factor 2 and factor 3, the forth item
needs to be recoded. Furthermore, all items of factor 5
should be recoded. As a result, for factor 1 higher scores
indicate a deeper belief in the certainty of medicalknowledge and in the solvability of medical questions.
For factor 2 and factor 3, higher scores indicate a deeper
belief in the trustworthiness of medical textbooks re-
spectively in the trustworthiness of medical information
on the Internet. For factor 4, higher values mean that
participants believe more that medical knowledge is bet-
ter justified by (daily) experience than by medical re-
search. For factor 5, higher values point to a stronger
belief in the stability of medical knowledge.
Discussion
For the purpose of this study, the most important result
is that a meaningful five-factor solution was found for
the EBAM. Cronbachs’s α was suitable for all factors.
Results not only indicated that measuring laypeople’s
epistemic beliefs about medicine is possible with a ques-
tionnaire, they also showed that laypeople have mean-
ingful beliefs about the nature of medical knowledge and
the trustworthiness of different sources.
The dimensions found are similar to those found in
most popular epistemic questionnaires, because the
EBAM takes into account aspects of the certainty and
stability of knowledge, the justification for knowing, and
the source of knowledge. The dimension Certainty of
Medical Knowledge focuses on the extent that medical
knowledge is fixed. The dimension Justification of Med-
ical Knowledge taps how laypeople justify knowledge, e.
g. by making use of authority and expertise (similar to
Hofer’s dimension “justification for knowing” [37]).
However, the EBAM thereby also considers that people
also make use of patients who have a specific disease (as
specialized “experts”) to justify knowledge. The two
EBAM factors on sources of knowledge, factor 2 and
factor 3, both explicitly focus on the credibility of
sources. In contrast to other instruments on epistemic
beliefs, the EBAM does not explicitly consider the self as
a knowing person. In the context of the EBAM where a
layperson deals with medical information, it is rather un-
realistic that the layperson becomes a knower herself or
himself in the sense of an active maker of meaning. In-
stead, a layperson will probably use different and more
or less reliable sources to come to know. Therefore, the
factor solution for the EBAM underlines the importance
of considering the role of sources in laypeople’s under-
standing of medicine: due to the fact that laypeople only
have limited medical knowledge on their own, they have
to rely on others. For example they may gain informa-
tion from medical textbooks (Credibility of Medical
Textbooks) or the Internet (Credibility of Medical Infor-
mation on the Internet). The factor Stability of Medical
Knowledge focuses on how stable or variable medical
knowledge is perceived to be.
This first study on the EBAM was successful at redu-
cing the number of items of the EBAM. One of our aims
Table 1 Pattern matrix for the five-factor solution
obtained through exploratory factor analysis
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Research in medicine has shown
that there is one clear answer
to most problems.
.541
If one has to decide between
different therapy advices,
one should only heed the
physician’s advice.
.533
If physicians address themselves
to the investigation of a question,
they will find the correct answer
to almost all questions.
.507
Medical knowledge is indefeasible. .445
If different physicians
predict the progress of a
person’s disease,
they almost always agree.
.412
In medicine, facts speak for themselves. .386
Some day medical researchers
will be able to clear




statements with regard to
medical research.
-.719

































Finally one can only
trust the medical advice
of someone who has
the (same) disease.
.663
People who have a
disease usually know
.569
Table 1 Pattern matrix for the five-factor solution
obtained through exploratory factor analysis (Continued)
better what to do
than physicians.
The knowledge gained by
medical research is
mostly not applicable to
everyday life. It only
refers to idealized experiments
in the laboratory.
.466
In choosing a therapy one
should only follow
the advices of a general
practitioner, even though




Scientific theories in medicine,
that we currently assume
to be right, can be confuted
in the future.
.599
Even medical knowledge has
to be revised over and over.
.563
The viewpoints in medical
research change constantly.
.456
Theories in medicine can
be confuted anytime.
.416
Even though medical research
deals intensively with
the origin of different diseases
like for example cancer,
it does not find one clearly
correct explanation.
.374
Number of items per factor 7 4 4 4 5
Cronbach’s α .69 .73 .74 .61 .60
Note: Pattern matrix, EFA, oblimin rotation, delta = 0, Maximum-Likelihood
extraction. The factor analysis was conducted on the original item scores. For
the calculation of sum scores for the five factors, several items need to be
recoded (see section “Recoding of the items for further analyses”).
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lyses. Results suggested that 17 items of the initial sam-
ple should be excluded in further analyses. The EBAM is
a promising new measure of laypeople’s epistemic beliefs
about medicine. In future research, the instrument could
be improved in by adding new items to enhance the
number of items per factor and the item to factor load-
ings, because some factors (factor 2, factor 3 and factor
4) could be represented by more items, and for these
factors item to factor loadings could be higher (however,
the measurement of epistemic beliefs is always a chal-
lenge and instruments usually do not show excellent
psychometric values [46]). Furthermore, subsequent
studies should aim for a replication of the factor struc-
ture across other, more heterogeneous samples, as the
sample in this first study is rather homogenous with re-
gard to age and education. In addition, it will be interest-
ing to investigate whether the EBAM is able to
differentiate between specific subgroups, e.g. between
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ledge. A further topic for future research is how people’s
medicine-specific epistemic beliefs guide their decision
making when facing a health problem.Conclusions
The EBAM exemplarily refers to everyday aspects of liv-
ing in a knowledge society, in which people must assess
and make judgments on knowledge for which they are
not an expert. Our results suggest that laypeople’s epi-
stemic beliefs about medicine include more “classic”
aspects of epistemic beliefs but especially aspects of the
nature of knowing like the credibility of sources and
how knowledge can be justified. In solving medical pro-
blems, laypeople not only have to rely on experts' expla-
nations and advice, but they also have to cope with the
fact that they are not able to acquire the knowledge and
skills which would be necessary to assess the experts’
knowledge claims. A real understanding of most medical
topics requires conceptual knowledge about medical,
biological and chemical structures and processes and
goes far beyond a non-expert’s understanding of medi-
cine, biology and chemistry. That means that the ques-
tion which source is credible and relevant becomes even
more important [9]. The factors found for the EBAM ex-
emplify this importance.
We hope that the EBAM will in the long run enhance
an understanding of what laypeople think about the na-
ture of medical knowledge and knowing, and how this
influences their processing of medical information and
medical decision making. Which views about the nature
of medical knowledge and knowing are typically held by
which people? Which views can doctors expect from
their patients? How do people who hold advanced views
and people who hold less advanced views differ in deal-
ing with medical information? Considering a patient’s
epistemic beliefs would be helpful for the doctor-patient-
relationship. Patients holding different epistemic beliefs
about medicine may deal with medical information differ-
ently and they also may be differently persuaded to initiate
a certain therapy. The introduction in this article to lay-
people’s epistemic beliefs about medicine and why they are
important will hopefully call attention to the construct.Competing interests
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